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Abstract. Public key cryptography protocols, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, will be rendered
insecure by Shor’s algorithm when large-scale quantum computers are built. Cryptographers are working on
quantum-resistant algorithms, and lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a prime candidate. However,
high computational complexity of these algorithms makes it challenging to implement lattice-based protocols
on low-power embedded devices. To address this challenge, we present Sapphire – a lattice cryptography
processor with configurable parameters. Efficient sampling, with a SHA-3-based PRNG, provides two orders
of magnitude energy savings; a single-port RAM-based number theoretic transform memory architecture is
proposed, which provides 124k-gate area savings; while a low-power modular arithmetic unit accelerates
polynomial computations. Our test chip was fabricated in TSMC 40nm low-power CMOS process, with
the Sapphire cryptographic core occupying 0.28 mm2 area consisting of 106k logic gates and 40.25 KB
SRAM. Sapphire can be programmed with custom instructions for polynomial arithmetic and sampling,
and it is coupled with a low-power RISC-V micro-processor to demonstrate NIST Round 2 lattice-based
CCA-secure key encapsulation and signature protocols Frodo, NewHope, qTESLA, CRYSTALS-Kyber and
CRYSTALS-Dilithium, achieving up to an order of magnitude improvement in performance and energy-
efficiency compared to state-of-the-art hardware implementations. All key building blocks of Sapphire are
constant-time and secure against timing and simple power analysis side-channel attacks. We also discuss
how masking-based DPA countermeasures can be implemented on the Sapphire core without any changes
to the hardware.
Keywords: Lattice-based Cryptography · LWE · Ring-LWE · Module-LWE · post-quantum · NIST Round
2 · Number Theoretic Transform · Sampling · energy-efficient · low-power · constant-time · side-channel
security · ASIC · hardware implementation
1 Introduction
Modern public key cryptography relies on hard mathematical problems such as integer factorization, discrete
logarithms over finite fields and discrete logarithms over elliptic curve groups. However, these problems can be
solved by a large-scale quantum computer in polynomial time using Shor’s algorithm [1], thus making today’s
public key protocols like RSA and ECC vulnerable to quantum attacks. Given the rapid advancement in
quantum computing technology over the past few years, cryptographers are developing quantum-secure public
key algorithms to protect today’s data from tomorrow’s threats. Lattice-based cryptography is being considered
one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptographic protocols because of its extensive security
analysis as well as small public key and signature sizes.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) formally initiated the process of standardizing
post-quantum cryptography in 2016 [2]. The first round of candidates were announced in late 2017, with
lattice-based cryptography accounting for 48% of the public-key encryption and key encapsulation (PKE/KEM)
schemes and 25% of the signature schemes. In early 2019, the candidates moving on to the second round were
announced [3], and lattice-based cryptography accounts for 53% (9 out of 17) and 33% (3 out of 9) of the
candidates for PKE/KEM and signature schemes respectively. The theoretical foundation of several of these
lattice-based protocols lies in the learning with errors (LWE) problem [4] and its variants such as Ring-LWE
[5] and Module-LWE [6], and the hardness of LWE has been well-studied in the presence of both classical and
quantum adversaries [7, 8]. This has been accompanied by several software and hardware implementations
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20] of LWE and Ring-LWE-based public key encryption and key
encapsulation protocols, each supporting specific lattice parameters chosen for increased performance and
efficiency. Existing lattice-based cryptography implementations, both in software and hardware, have been
thoroughly surveyed in [21]. Most of the hardware implementations focus on FPGA demonstration in order
to support reconfigurability of lattice parameters, which is especially important for a fast evolving field like
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2 Sapphire: A Configurable Lattice Crypto-Processor
lattice-based cryptography, while existing ASIC implementations either lack configurability or have power
and area overheads. Some of the key challenges of implementing lattice-based cryptography in ASICs have
been discussed in [22], and this work presents a solution using a combination of architectural and algorithmic
techniques.
Our contributions: In this work, we present Sapphire – a configurable lattice cryptography processor –
which combines low-power modular arithmetic, area-efficient memory architecture and fast sampling techniques
to achieve high energy-efficiency and low cycle count, ideal for securing low-power embedded systems. The key
technical aspects of our work are as follows:
1. A low-power modular arithmetic core, with configurable prime modulus, is used to accelerate polynomial
arithmetic operations; a pseudo-configurable modular multiplier is also implemented, which provides up
to 3× improvement in energy-efficiency.
2. A single-port SRAM-based number theoretic transform (NTT) memory architecture provides 124k-gate
area savings without any loss in performance or energy-efficiency.
3. An efficient Keccak core is combined with fast sampling techniques to speed up polynomial sampling,
while supporting a wide variety of discrete distribution parameters suitable for lattice-based schemes.
4. These efficient hardware building blocks are integrated together with an instruction memory and decoder
to build our crypto-processor, which can be programmed with custom instructions for polynomial sampling
and arithmetic.
5. The Sapphire crypto-processor is coupled with an efficient RISC-V micro-processor to demonstrate several
NIST Round 2 lattice-based key encapsulation and signature protocols such as Frodo [23], NewHope
[24], qTESLA [25], CRYSTALS-Kyber [26] and CRYSTALS-Dilithium [27], achieving more than an
order of magnitude improvement in performance and energy-efficiency compared to state-of-the-art
assembly-optimized software and hardware implementations.
6. All the key building blocks, such as NTT, polynomial arithmetic and binomial sampling, are constant-time
and secure against timing and simple power analysis attacks. While our baseline protocol implementations
are not secure against differential power analysis attacks, we discuss how the programmability of our
crypto-processor can be utilized to implement masking-based countermeasures.
7. Our ASIC implementation was fabricated in the TSMC 40nm low-power CMOS process, and all protocol-
level demonstrations and side-channel measurements have been conducted on our test chip.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief mathematical background on LWE
and associated computations; in Section 3, we present our implementation of energy-efficient modular arithmetic
along with an area-efficient NTT memory architecture; in Section 4, we describe our discrete distribution
sampler accelerated by a low-power SHA-3 core; Section 5 describes the overall chip architecture; Section
6 presents detailed measurement results obtained from evaluating lattice-based protocols on our test chip,
comparison with state-of-the-art software and hardware implementations as well as side-channel analysis; a
summary of our key conclusions along with future research directions are discussed in Section 7. This version is
same as our CHES 2019 paper except for fixed typos and the addition of Frodo-1344 implementation results.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to LWE, Ring-LWE and Module-LWE along with the associated
computations. We use bold lower-case symbols to denote vectors and bold upper-case symbols to denote
matrices. The symbol lg is used to denote all logarithms with base 2. The set of all integers is denoted as Z
and the quotient ring of integers modulo q is denoted as Zq. For two n-dimensional vectors a and b, their inner
product is written as 〈a, b〉 =∑n−1i=0 ai · bi. The concatenation of two vectors a and b is written as a || b.
2.1 LWE and Related Lattice Problems
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [4] acts as the foundation for several modern lattice-based cryptography
schemes. The LWE problem states that given a polynomial number of samples of the form (a, 〈a, s〉+ e), it is
difficult to determine secret vector s ∈ Znq , where vector a ∈ Znq is sampled uniformly at random and error e is
sampled from the appropriate error distribution χ. Examples of secure LWE parameters are (n, q) = (640, 215),
(n, q) = (976, 216) and (n, q) = (1344, 216) for Frodo [23].
LWE-based cryptosystems involve large matrix operations which are computationally expensive and also
result in large key sizes. To solve this problem, the Ring-LWE problem [5] was proposed, which uses ideal
Utsav Banerjee, Tenzin S. Ukyab and Anantha P. Chandrakasan 3
lattices. Let Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1) be the ring of polynomials where n is power of 2. The Ring-LWE problem
states that given samples of the form (a, a · s + e), it is difficult to determine the secret polynomial s ∈ Rq,
where the polynomial a ∈ Rq is sampled uniformly at random and the coefficients of the error polynomial e are
small samples from the error distribution χ. Examples of secure Ring-LWE parameters are (n, q) = (512, 12289)
and (n, q) = (1024, 12289) for NewHope [24].
Module-LWE [6] provides a middle ground between LWE and Ring-LWE. By using module lattices, it
reduces the algebraic structure present in Ring-LWE and increases security while not compromising too much on
the computational efficiency. The Module-LWE problem states that given samples of the form (a,aTs+ e), it
is difficult to determine the secret vector s ∈ Rkq , where the vector a ∈ Rkq is sampled uniformly at random and
the coefficients of the error polynomial e are small samples from the error distribution χ. Examples of secure
Module-LWE parameters are (n, k, q) = (256, 2, 7681), (n, k, q) = (256, 3, 7681) and (n, k, q) = (256, 4, 7681) for
CRYSTALS-Kyber [26].
2.2 Number Theoretic Transform
While the protocols based on standard lattices (LWE) involve matrix-vector operations modulo q, all the
arithmetic is performed in the ring of polynomials Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1) when working with ideal and module
lattices. There are several efficient algorithms for polynomial multiplication [28], and the Number Theoretic
Transform (NTT) is one such technique widely used in lattice-based cryptography.
The NTT is a generalization of the well-known Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) where all the arithmetic is
performed in a finite field instead of complex numbers. Instead of working with powers of the n-th complex root
of unity exp(−2pij/n), NTT uses the n-th primitive root of unity ωn in the ring Zq, that is, ωn is an element in
Zq such that ωnn = 1mod q and ωin 6= 1mod q for i 6= n. In order to have elements of order n, the modulus q is
chosen to be a prime such that q ≡ 1modn. A polynomial a(x) ∈ Rq with coefficients a(x) = (a0, a1, · · · , an−1)
has the NTT representation aˆ(x) = (aˆ0, aˆ1, · · · , ˆan−1), where
aˆi =
n−1∑
j=0
ajω
ij
n mod q ∀ i ∈ [0, n− 1]
The inverse NTT (INTT) operation converts aˆ(x) = (aˆ0, aˆ1, · · · , ˆan−1) back to a(x) as
ai =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
aˆjω
−ij
n mod q ∀ i ∈ [0, n− 1]
Note that the INTT operation is similar to NTT, except that ωn is replaced by ω−1n mod q and the final results
is divided by n. An iterative in-place version of the NTT algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1 [29, 30]. The
Algorithm 1 Iterative In-Place NTT [29]
Require: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Rq and n-th primitive root of unity ωn ∈ Zq
Ensure: Polynomial aˆ(x) ∈ Rq such that aˆ(x) = NTT(a(x))
1: aˆ← PolyBitRev(a)
2: for (s = 1; s ≤ lgn; s = s+ 1) do
3: m← 2s
4: ωm ← ωn/mn
5: for (k = 0; k < n; k = k +m) do
6: ω ← 1
7: for (j = 0; j < m/2; j = j + 1) do
8: t← ω · aˆ[k + j +m/2] mod q
9: u← aˆ[k + j]
10: aˆ[k + j]← u+ t mod q
11: aˆ[k + j +m/2]← u− t mod q
12: ω ← ω · ωm mod q
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: return aˆ
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PolyBitRev function performs a permutation on the input polynomial a such that aˆ[i] = PolyBitRev(a)[i] =
a[BitRev(i)], where BitRev is formally defined as BitRev(i) =
∑lgn−1
j=0 (((i  j) & 1)  (lgn − 1 − i)) (for
positive integer i and power-of-two n), that is, bit-wise reversal of the binary representation of the index i.
Since there are lgn stages in the NTT outer loop, with O(n) operations in each stage, its time complexity is
O(n lgn). The factors ω are called the twiddle factors, similar to FFT.
The NTT provides a fast multiplication algorithm in Rq with time complexity O(n lgn) instead of O(n2) for
schoolbook multiplication. Given two polynomials a, b ∈ Rq, their product c = a · b ∈ Rq can be computed as
c = INTT ( NTT(a)  NTT(b) )
where  denotes coefficient-wise multiplication of the polynomials. Since the product of a and b, before
reduction modulo f(x) = xn + 1, has 2n coefficients, using the above equation directly to compute a · b will
require padding both a and b with n zeros. To eliminate this overhead, the negative-wrapped convolution [31] is
used, with the additional requirement q ≡ 1mod 2n so that both the n-th and 2n-th primitive roots of unity
modulo q exist, respectively denoted as ωn and ψ =
√
ωnmod q. By multiplying a and b coefficient-wise by
powers of ψ before the NTT computation, and by multiplying INTT(NTT(a)NTT(b) ) coefficient-wise by
powers of ψ−1 mod q, no zero padding is required and the n-point NTT can be used directly.
Similar to FFT, the NTT inner loop involves butterfly computations. There are two types of butterfly
operations – Cooley-Tukey (CT) and Gentleman-Sande (GS) [32]. The CT butterfly-based NTT requires inputs
in normal order and generates outputs in bit-reversed order, similar to the decimation-in-time FFT. The GS
butterfly-based NTT requires inputs to be in bit-reversed order while the outputs are generated in normal
order, similar to the decimation-in-frequency FFT. Using the same butterfly for both NTT and INTT requires
a bit-reversal permutation. However, the bit-reversal can be avoided by using CT for NTT and GS for INTT,
as proposed in [32].
2.3 Sampling
In lattice-based protocols, the public vectors a are generated from the uniform distribution over Zq through
rejection sampling. The secret vectors s and error terms e are sampled from the distribution χ typically with
zero mean and appropriate standard deviation σ. Accurate sampling of s and e is critical to the security of these
protocols, and the sampling must be constant-time to prevent side-channel leakage of the secret information.
Although the original LWE proof used discrete Gaussian distributions for sampling the error terms, several
lattice-based schemes use binomial, uniform and ternary distributions for efficiency. A detailed survey of
different sampling techniques is available in [21].
3 Modular Arithmetic and NTT
The core arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) of Sapphire consists of a 24-bit data-path, with modular operations
in Fq for configurable q. In this section, we describe the details of our energy-efficient modular arithmetic
implementation, the ALU design and our area-efficient NTT memory architecture.
3.1 Modular Arithmetic Implementation
The modular arithmetic core consists of a 24-bit adder, a 24-bit subtractor and a 24-bit multiplier along with
associated modular reduction logic. Our modular adder and subtractor designs are shown in Fig. 1, and the
corresponding pseudo-codes are shown in Algorithms 2 and 3. Both designs use a pair of adder and subtractor,
with the sum, carry bit, difference and borrow bit denoted as s, c, d and b respectively. Modular reduction is
performed using conditional subtraction and addition, which are computed in the same cycle to avoid timing
side-channels. The synthesized areas of the adder and the subtractor are around 550 GE (gate equivalent) each
in area.
For modular multiplication, we use a 24-bit multiplier followed by Barrett reduction [33] modulo a prime q
of size up to 24 bits. Barrett reduction does not exploit any special property of the modulus q, thus making
it ideal for supporting configurable moduli. Let z be the 48-bit product to be reduced to Zq, then Barrett
reduction computes zmod q by estimating the quotient bz/qc without performing any division, as shown in
Algorithm 4. Barrett reduction involves two multiplications, one subtraction, one bit-shift and one conditional
subtraction. The value of 1/q is approximated as m/2k, with the error of approximation being e = 1/q−m/2k,
therefore the reduction is valid as long as ze < 1. Since z < q2, k is set to be the smallest number such that
e = 1/q − (b2k/qc/2k) < 1/q2. Typically, k is very close to 2 dlg qe, that is, the bit-size of q2.
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Figure 1: Design of our modular adder and subtractor with configurable modulus q.
Algorithm 2 Modular Addition
Require: x, y ∈ Zq
Ensure: z = x+ y mod q
1: (c, s)← x+ y
2: (b, d)← s− q
3: if c = 1 or b = 0 then
4: z ← d
5: else
6: z ← s
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm 3 Modular Subtraction
Require: x, y ∈ Zq
Ensure: z = x− y mod q
1: (b, d)← x− y
2: (c, s)← d+ q
3: if b = 1 then
4: z ← s
5: else
6: z ← d
7: end if
8: return z
In order to understand the trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency in modular multiplication, we have
implemented two different architectures of Barrett reduction logic: (1) with fully configurable modulus (q can
be an arbitrary prime) and (2) with pseudo-configurable modulus (q belongs to a specific set of primes), as
shown in Fig. 2.
Apart from the prime q (which can be up to 24 bits), the fully configurable version requires two additional
inputs m and k such that m = b2k/qc (m and k are allowed to be up to 24 bits and 6 bits respectively). It
consists of total 3 multipliers, as shown in Fig. 2a, the first two being used to compute z = x · y and z ·m
respectively. For obtaining t = (z ·m) k, the bit-wise shift is implemented purely using combinational logic
(multiplexers) because shifting bits sequentially in registers can be extremely inefficient in terms of power
consumption. We assume that 16 ≤ k ≤ 48 since q is not larger than 24 bits, q is typically not smaller than 8
bits and we know that k ≈ 2 dlg qe. The third multiplier is used to compute t · q, and a pair of subtractors is
used to calculate z − (t · q) and perform the final reduction step. All the steps are computed in a single cycle to
avoid any potential timing side-channels. The design was synthesized at 100 MHz (with near-zero slack) and
occupies around 11k GE area, which includes the area (around 4k GE) of the 24-bit multiplier used to compute
z = x · y.
The pseudo-configurable modular multiplier implements Barrett reduction logic for the following primes
used by NIST Round 1 lattice-based candidates: 7681 (CRYSTALS-Kyber) [26], 12289 (NewHope) [24], 40961
(R.EMBLEM) [34], 65537 (pqNTRUSign) [35], 120833 (Ding Key Exchange) [36], 133121 / 184321 (LIMA) [37],
8380417 (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) [27], 8058881 (qTESLA v1.0) and 4205569 / 4206593 / 8404993 (qTESLA
Algorithm 4 Modular Multiplication with Barrett Reduction [33]
Require: x, y ∈ Zq, m and k such that m = b2k/qc
Ensure: z = x · y mod q
1: z ← x · y
2: t← (z ·m) k
3: z ← z − (t · q)
4: if z ≥ q then
5: z ← z − q
6: end if
7: return z
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Figure 2: Two different single-cycle modular multiplier architectures with (a) fully configurable and (b)
pseudo-configurable modulus for Barrett reduction.
Figure 3: Comparison of modular multiplication energy for the two reduction architectures.
v2.0) [25]. As shown in Fig. 2b, there is dedicated reduction block for each of these primes, and the qSEL input
is used to select the output of the appropriate block while the inputs to the other blocks are data-gated to save
power. Since the reduction blocks have the parameters m, k and q coded in digital logic and do not require
explicit multipliers, they involve lesser computation than the fully configurable reduction circuit from Fig. 2a,
albeit at the cost of some additional area and decrease in flexibility. The reduction becomes particularly efficient
when at least one of m and q or both can be written in the form 2l1 ± 2l2 ± · · · ± 1, where l1, l2, · · · are not
more than four positive integers. For example, we consider the CRYSTALS primes: for q = 7681 = 213 − 29 + 1
we have k = 21 and m = 273 = 28 + 24 + 1, and for q = 8380417 = 223 − 213 + 1 we have k = 46 and
m = 8396807 = 223 + 213 + 23 − 1. Therefore, the multiplications by q and m can be converted to significantly
cheaper bit-shifts and additions / subtractions, as shown in Algorithms 5 and 6. Implementation details and
reduction parameters for each customized modular reduction block are provided in Appendix A. This design
also performs modular multiplication in a single cycle. It was synthesized at 100 MHz (with near-zero slack)
and occupies around 19k GE area, including the area of the 24-bit multiplier.
In Fig. 3, we compare the simulated energy consumption of the fully configurable and pseudo-configurable
modular multiplier architectures for all the primes mentioned earlier. As expected, the multiplication itself
consumes the same energy in both cases, but the modular reduction energy is up to 6× lower for the pseudo-
configurable design. The overall decrease in modular multiplication energy, considering both multiplication and
Algorithm 5 Reduction mod 7681
Require: q = 7681, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 8) + (x 4) + x
2: t← t 21
3: t← (t 13)− (t 9) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm 6 Reduction mod 8380417
Require: q = 8380417, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 23) + (x 13) + (x 3)− x
2: t← t 46
3: t← (t 23)− (t 13) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
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Figure 4: Unified butterfly in Cooley-Tukey and Gentleman-Sande configurations.
reduction together, is up to 3×, clearly highlighting the benefit of the dedicated modular reduction data-paths
when working with prime moduli. For reduction modulo 2m (m < 24), e.g., in the case of Frodo, the output of
the 24-bit multiplier is simply bit-wise AND-ed with 2m − 1 implying that the modular reduction energy is
negligible.
3.2 Butterfly Unit and ALU
Next, we elaborate how the modular arithmetic units described earlier are integrated together to build the
butterfly module. As discussed in Section 2, NTT computations involve butterfly operations similar to the
Fast Fourier Transform, with the only difference being that all arithmetic is performed modulo q instead of
complex numbers. There are two butterfly configurations – Cooley-Tukey (or DIT) and Gentleman-Sande (or
DIF). In terms of arithmetic, the DIT butterfly computes (a+ ωb mod q, a− ωb mod q) and the DIF butterfly
computes (a+ b mod q, (a− b)ω mod q), where a and b are the inputs to the butterfly and ω is the twiddle
factor. The DIT butterfly requires inputs to be in bit-reversed order and the DIF butterfly generates outputs
in bit-reversed order, thus making DIF and DIT suitable for NTT and INTT respectively. While software
implementations have the flexibility to program both configurations, hardware designs typically implement
either DIT or DIF, thus requiring bit-reversals. To solve this problem, we have implemented a unified butterfly
architecture [38] which can be configured as both DIT and DIF, as shown in Fig. 4. It consists of two sets of
modular adders and subtractors along with some multiplexing circuitry to select whether the multiplication with
ω is performed before or after the addition and subtraction. Since the critical path of the design is inside the
modular multiplier, there is no impact on system performance. The associated area overhead is also negligible.
The modular arithmetic blocks inside the butterfly are re-used for coefficient-wise polynomial arithmetic
operations as well as for multiplying polynomials with the appropriate powers of ψ and ψ−1 during negative-
wrapped convolution. Apart from butterfly and arithmetic modulo q, the Sapphire ALU also supports the
following bit-wise operations – AND, OR, XOR, left shift and right shift.
3.3 NTT Memory Architecture
Hardware architectures for polynomial multiplication using NTT consist of memory banks for storing the
polynomials along with the ALU which performs butterfly computations. Since each butterfly needs to read
two inputs and write two outputs all in the same cycle, these memory banks are typically implemented using
dual-port RAMs [9, 39, 30, 19] or four-port RAMs [17]. Although true dual-port memory is easily available in
state-of-the-art commercial FPGAs in the form of block RAMs (BRAMs), use of dual-port SRAMs in ASIC
can pose large area overheads in resource-constrained devices. Compared to a simple single-port SRAM, a
dual-port SRAM has double the number of row and column decoders, write drivers and read sense amplifiers.
Also, the bit-cells in a low-power dual-port SRAM consist of ten transistors (10T) compared to the usual six
transistor (6T) bit-cells in a single-port SRAM [40]. Therefore, the area of a dual-port SRAM can be as much
as double the area of a single-port SRAM with the same number of bits and column muxing. To reduce this
area overhead, we implement an area-efficient NTT memory architecture [38] which uses the constant-geometry
FFT data-flow [41] and consists of single-port SRAMs only.
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Algorithm 7 Constant Geometry Out-of-Place NTT [42]
Require: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Rq and n-th primitive root of unity ωn ∈ Zq
Ensure: Polynomial aˆ(x) ∈ Rq such that aˆ(x) = NTT(a(x))
1: a← PolyBitRev(a)
2: for (s = 1; s ≤ lgn; s = s+ 1) do
3: for (j = 0; j < n/2; j = j + 1) do
4: k ← bj/2lg (n−s)c · 2lg (n−s)
5: aˆ[j]← a[2j] + a[2j + 1] · ωkn mod q
6: aˆ[j + n/2]← a[2j]− a[2j + 1] · ωkn mod q
7: end for
8: if s 6= lgn then
9: a← aˆ
10: end if
11: end for
12: return aˆ
The constant geometry NTT is described in Algorithm 7 [42, 39]. Clearly, the coefficients of the polynomial
are accessed in the same order for each stage, thus simplifying the read/write control circuitry. For constant
geometry DIT NTT, the butterfly inputs are a[2j] and a[2j + 1] and the outputs are aˆ[j] and aˆ[j + n/2], while
the inputs are a[j] and a[j + n/2] and the outputs are aˆ[2j] and aˆ[2j + 1] for DIF NTT. However, the constant
geometry NTT is inherently out-of-place, therefore requiring storage for both polynomials a and aˆ. For our
hardware implementation, we create two memory banks – left and right – to store these two polynomials
while allowing the butterfly inputs and outputs to ping-pong between them during each stage of the transform.
Although out-of-place NTT requires storage for both the input and output polynomials, this does not affect
the total memory requirements of the crypto-processor because the total number of polynomials required to be
stored during the protocol execution is greater than two, e.g., four polynomials are involved in any computation
of the form b = a · s+ e.
Next, we describe how these memory banks are constructed using single-port SRAMs so that each butterfly
can be computed in a single cycle without causing read/write hazards. As shown in Fig. 5a, each polynomial is
split among four single port SRAMs Mem 0-3 on the basis of the least and most significant bits (LSB and
MSB) of the coefficient index (or address addr). This allows simultaneously accessing coefficient index pairs of
the form (2j, 2j + 1) and (j, j + n/2). Our NTT memory architecture is shown in Fig. 5b, which consists of
two such memory banks labelled as LWE Poly Cache. In every cycle, the butterfly inputs are read from two
Figure 5: (a) Memory bank construction using single-port SRAMs and (b) proposed area-efficient NTT
architecture using two such memory banks.
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Figure 6: Data-flow of our NTT memory architecture in the first two cycles (butterfly inputs are in yellow and
outputs are in green).
Figure 7: Memory access patterns for 8-point DIT and DIF NTT using our single-port SRAM-based memory
architecture (R and W denote read and write respectively).
different single-port SRAMs (out of four SRAMs in the input memory bank) and the outputs are also written
to two different single-port SRAMs (out of four SRAMs in the output memory bank), thus avoiding hazards.
The data flow in the first two cycles of NTT is shown in Fig. 6, where the input polynomial a is stored in
the left bank and the output polynomial aˆ is stored in the right bank. As the input and output polynomials
exchange their memory banks from one stage to the next, our NTT control circuitry ensures that the same
data-flow is maintained. To illustrate this, the memory access patterns for all three stages of an 8-point NTT
are shown in Fig. 7 for both decimation-in-time and decimation-in-frequency.
The two memory banks consist of four 1024× 24-bit single-port SRAMs each (24 KB total). Together they
store 8192 entries, which can be split into four 2048-dimension polynomials or eight 1024-dimension polynomials
or sixteen 512-dimension polynomials or thirty-two 256-dimension polynomials or sixty-four 128-dimension
polynomials or one-hundred-twenty-eight 64-dimension polynomials. By constructing this memory using
single-port SRAMs (and some additional read-data multiplexing circuitry), we have achieved area savings
equivalent to 124k GE compared to a dual-port SRAM-based implementation. This is particularly important
since SRAMs account for a large portion of the total hardware area in ASIC implementations of lattice-based
cryptography [17, 43].
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Table 1: Comparison of our NTT performance with state-of-the-art
Design Platform Tech VDD Freq Parameters NTT NTT
(nm) (V) (MHz) Cycles Energy
This work ASIC 40 1.1 72
(n = 256, q = 7681) 1,289 165.98 nJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 2,826 410.52 nJ
(n = 1024, q = 12289) 6,155 894.28 nJ
Software
[44]
ARM
Cortex-M4 - 3.0 100
(n = 256, q = 7681) 22,031 13.55 µJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 34,262 21.07 µJ
(n = 1024, q = 12289) 75,006 46.13 µJ
Song et al.
[17] ASIC 40 0.9 300
(n = 256, q = 7681) 160 31 nJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 492 96 nJ
Nejatollahi
et al. [14] ASIC 45 1.0 100 (n = 512, q = 12289)
2,854 1016.02 nJ
11,053 596.86 nJ
Fritzmann
et al. [43] ASIC 65 1.2 25
(n = 256, q = 7681) 2,056 254.52 nJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 4,616 549.98 nJ
(n = 1024, q = 12289) 10,248 1205.03 nJ
Roy et al.
[9] FPGA - -
313 (n = 256, q = 7681) 1,691 -
278 (n = 512, q = 12289) 3,443 -
Du et al.
[30] FPGA - - 233
(n = 256, q = 7681) 4,066 -
(n = 512, q = 12289) 8,806 -
In order to allow configurable parameters, our NTT hardware also requires additional storage (labelled
as NTT Constants RAM in Fig. 5) for the pre-computed twiddle factors: ωj2i , ω
−j
2i mod q for i ∈ [1, lgn] and
j ∈ [0, 2i−1) and ψi, n−1ψ−imod q for i ∈ [0, n). Since n ≤ 2048 and q < 224, this would require another 24 KB
of memory. To reduce this overhead, we exploit the following properties of ω and ψ: ωn/2 = ω2n, ω−jn = ωn−jn
and ω = ψ2 [30]. Then, it’s sufficient to store only ωjn for j ∈ [0, n/2) and ψi, n−1ψ−imod q for i ∈ [0, n), thus
reducing the twiddle factor memory size by 37.5% down to 15 KB.
Finally, we compare the energy-efficiency and performance of our NTT with state-of-the-art software and
ASIC hardware implementations in Table 1. For the software implementation, we have used assembly-optimized
code for ARM Cortex-M4 from the PQM4 crypto library [44], and measurements were performed using the
NUCLEO-F411RE development board [45]. Total cycle count of our NTT is (n2 + 1) lgn+ (n+ 1), including
the multiplication of polynomial coefficients with powers of ψ. All measurements for our NTT implementation
were performed on our test chip operating at clock frequency 72 MHz and nominal supply voltage 1.1 V.
Our hardware-accelerated NTT is up to 11× more energy-efficient than the software implementation, after
accounting for voltage scaling. It is 2.5× more energy-efficient compared to the fast NTT design from [14] with
similar cycle count, and 1.5× more energy-efficient compared to the slow NTT design from [14] with 4× cycle
count. Our NTT is almost twice as fast as [43], since our memory architecture allows computing one butterfly
per cycle even with single-port SRAMs, while having similar energy consumption. The energy-efficiency of
our NTT implementation is largely due to the careful design of low-power modular arithmetic, as discussed
earlier, which decreases overall modular reduction complexity and simplifies the logic circuitry. However, our
NTT is still about 4× less energy-efficient compared to [17], primarily due to the fact that [17] uses 16 parallel
butterfly units along with dedicated four-port scratch-pad buffers to achieve higher parallelism and lower energy
consumption at the cost of significantly larger chip area (2.05 mm2) compared to our design (0.28 mm2). As
will be discussed in Section 6, sampling accounts for majority of the computational cost in Ring-LWE and
Module-LWE schemes, therefore justifying our choice of area-efficient NTT architecture at the cost of some
energy overhead.
4 Discrete Distribution Sampler
Hardness of the LWE problem is directly related to statistical properties of the error samples. Therefore, an
accurate and efficient sampler is a critical component of any lattice cryptography implementation. Sampling
accounts for a major portion of the computational overhead in software implementations of ideal and module
lattice-based protocols [46]. A cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CS-PRNG) is used
to generate uniformly random numbers, which are then post-processed to convert them into samples from
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Table 2: Comparison of CS-PRNG designs
PRNG Area (kGE) a Cycles / No. of Energy
Round PRNG Bits (pJ/bit) b
SHAKE-128 34.5 (23.5) 24 1344 1.67
SHAKE-256 1088 2.07
ChaCha20 21.1 (17.5) 20 512 3.53
AES-128-CTR 15.0 (11.1) 11 128 5.10
AES-256-CTR 15 128 7.56
a Area of placed-and-routed design (post-synthesis area in brackets)
b Energy measured from test chip operating at 1.1 V
Figure 8: Analysis of SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256, AES-128-CTR, AES-256-CTR and ChaCha20 in terms of
energy per bit, bits per cycle and area-energy product.
different discrete probability distributions. In this section, we describe our design of energy-efficient CS-PRNG
along with fast sampling techniques for configurable distribution parameters.
4.1 Energy-Efficient CS-PRNG
Some of the standard choices for CS-PRNG are SHA-3 in the SHAKE mode [47], AES in counter mode [48] and
ChaCha20 [49]. In order to identify the most efficient among these, we have compared them in terms of area,
pseudo-random bit generation performance and energy consumption, as shown in Table 2. Only place-and-route
area and measured energy are considered for all analysis, and synthesis area is reported for reference. For
fair comparison, all the three primitives – SHA-3, AES and ChaCha20 – were implemented as full data path
architectures. From Fig. 8, we observe that although all three primitives have comparable area-energy product,
SHA-3 is 2× more energy-efficient than ChaCha20 and 3× more energy-efficient than AES; and this is largely
due to the fact that SHA-3 generates the highest number of pseudo-random bits per round.
The basic building block of SHA-3 is the Keccak permutation function [50]. Therefore, our PRNG consists
of a 24-cycle Keccak-f[1600] core [38] which can be configured in different SHA-3 modes and consumes 2.33 nJ
per round at nominal voltage of 1.1 V (and 0.89 nJ per round at 0.68 V). Its 1600-bit state is processed in
parallel, thus avoiding expensive register shifts and multiplexing required in serial architectures. Fig. 9 shows
the overall architecture our discrete distribution sampler with the energy-efficient SHA-3 core. Pseudo-random
Figure 9: Architecture of discrete distribution sampler with Keccak-based PRNG core.
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bits generated by SHAKE-128 or SHAKE-256 are stored in the 1600-bit Keccak state register, and shifted out
32 bits at a time as required by the sampler. The sampler then feeds these bits, AND-ed with the appropriate
bit mask to truncate them to desired size, to the post-processing logic to perform one of the following five types
of operations – rejection sampling in [0, q), binomial sampling with standard deviation σ, discrete Gaussian
sampling with standard deviation σ and desired precision up to 32 bits, uniform sampling in [−η, η] for η < q
and trinary sampling in {−1, 0,+1} with specified weights for the +1 and −1 samples.
4.2 Rejection Sampling
The public polynomial a in Ring-LWE and the public vector a in Module-LWE have their coefficients uniformly
drawn from Zq through rejection sampling, where uniformly random numbers of desired bit size are obtained
from the PRNG as candidate samples and only numbers smaller than q are accepted. The probability that a
random number is not accepted is known as the rejection probability.
Table 3: Rejection probabilities for different primes with and without fast sampling
Prime Bit Rej. Prob. Scaling Rej. Prob. Decrease in
Size (w/o. scaling) Factor (w. scaling) Rej. Prob.
7681 13 0.06 1 0.06 -
12289 14 0.25 5 0.06 0.19
40961 16 0.37 3 0.06 0.31
65537 17 0.50 7 0.12 0.38
120833 17 0.08 1 0.08 -
133121 18 0.49 7 0.11 0.38
184321 18 0.30 11 0.03 0.27
8380417 23 ≈ 0 1 ≈ 0 -
8058881 23 0.04 1 0.04 -
4205569 23 0.50 7 0.12 0.38
4206593 23 0.50 7 0.12 0.38
8404993 24 0.50 7 0.12 0.38
For prime q, the rejection probability is calculated as (1 − q/2dlg qe). In Table 3, we list the rejection
probabilities for primes mentioned earlier in Section 3. Clearly, different primes have very different rejection
probabilities, often as high as 50%, which can be a bottleneck in lattice-based protocols. To solve this problem,
we refer to [51] where pseudo-random numbers smaller than 5q are accepted for q = 12289, thus reducing the
rejection probability from 25% to 6%. We extend this technique for any prime q by scaling the rejection bound
from q to kq, for appropriate small integer k, so that the rejection probability is now (1− kq/2dlg kqe). We list
these scaling factors for the primes in Table 3 along with the corresponding decrease in rejection probability.
Although this method reduces rejection rates, the output samples now lie in [0, kq) instead of [0, q). In
[51], for q = 12289 and k = 5, the accepted samples are reduced to Zq by subtracting q from them up to
four times. Since k is not fixed for our rejection sampler, we employ Barrett reduction [33] for this purpose.
Unlike modular multiplication, where the inputs lie in [0, q2), the inputs here are much smaller; so the Barrett
reduction parameters are also quite small, therefore requiring little additional logic. In Table 4, we compare our
Table 4: Comparison of rejection sampling with software
Design Platform Tech VDD Freq Parameters Samp. Samp.
(nm) (V) (MHz) Cycles Energy
This work ASIC 40 1.1 72
(n = 256, q = 7681) 461 50.90 nJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 921 105.74 nJ
(n = 1024, q = 12289) 1,843 211.46 nJ
Software
[44]
ARM
Cortex-M4 - 3.0 100
(n = 256, q = 7681) 60,433 37.17 µJ
(n = 512, q = 12289) 139,153 85.58 µJ
(n = 1024, q = 12289) 284,662 175.07 µJ
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Table 5: Comparison of binomial sampling with state-of-the-art
Design Platform Tech VDD Freq Parameters Samp. Samp.
(nm) (V) (MHz) Cycles Energy
This work ASIC 40 1.1 72
(n = 256, k = 4) 505 58.20 nJ
(n = 512, k = 8) 1,009 116.26 nJ
(n = 1024, k = 8) 2,018 232.50 nJ
Software
[44]
ARM
Cortex-M4 - 3.0 100
(n = 256, k = 4) 52,603 32.35 µJ
(n = 512, k = 8) 155,872 95.86 µJ
(n = 1024, k = 8) 319,636 196.58 µJ
Song et al.
[17] ASIC 40 0.9 300 (n = 512, k = 16) 3,704 1.25 µJ
Oder et al.
[13] FPGA - - 125 (n = 1024, k = 16) 33,792 -
rejection sampler performance (SHAKE-128 used as PRNG) with software implementation on ARM Cortex-M4
using assembly-optimized Keccak [44].
4.3 Binomial Sampling
For binomial sampling, we take two k-bit chunks from the PRNG and computes the difference of their Hamming
weights, as proposed in [24]. The resulting samples follow a binomial distribution with standard deviation
σ =
√
k/2. We allow configuring k to any value up to 32, thus providing the flexibility to support different
standard deviations.
We compare our binomial sampling performance (SHAKE-256 used as PRNG) with state-of-the-art software
and hardware implementations in Table 5. Our sampler is more than two orders of magnitude more energy-
efficient compared to the software implementation on ARM Cortex-M4 which uses assembly-optimized Keccak
[44]. It is also 14× more efficient than [17] which uses Knuth-Yao sampling [52] for binomial distributions with
ChaCha20 as PRNG.
4.4 Discrete Gaussian Sampling
Our discrete Gaussian sampler implements the inversion method of sampling [53] from a discrete symmetric
zero-mean distribution χ on Z with small support which approximates a rounded continuous Gaussian distribu-
tion, e.g., in Frodo [23] and R.EMBLEM [34]. For a distribution with support Sχ = {−s, · · · ,−1, 0, 1, · · · , s},
where s is a small positive integer, the probabilities Pr(z) for z ∈ Sχ, such that Pr(z) = Pr(−z) can be derived
from the cumulative distribution table (CDT) Tχ = (Tχ[0], Tχ[1], · · · , Tχ[s]), where 2−r ·Tχ[0] = Pr(0)/2−1 and
2−r ·Tχ[z] = Pr(0)/2− 1 +
∑i=z
i=1 Pr(i) for z ∈ [1, s] for precision r. Given random inputs r0 ∈ {0, 1}, r1 ∈ [0, 2r)
and distribution table Tχ, a sample e ∈ Z from χ can be obtained using Algorithm 8 [23].
The sampling must be constant-time in order to eliminate timing side-channels, therefore the algorithm
does a complete loop through the entire table Tχ. The comparison r1 > Tχ[z] must also be implemented in
a constant-time manner. Our implementation adheres to these requirements and uses a 64 × 32 RAM to
store the CDT, allowing the parameters s ≤ 64 and r ≤ 32 to be configured according to the choice of the
Algorithm 8 Discrete Gaussian Sampling using Inversion Method [23]
Require: Random inputs r0 ∈ {0, 1}, r1 ∈ [0, 2r) and table Tχ = (Tχ[0], · · · , Tχ[s])
Ensure: Sample e ∈ Z from χ
1: e← 0
2: for (z = 0; z < s; z = z + 1) do
3: if r1 > Tχ[z] then
4: e← e+ 1
5: end if
6: end for
7: e← (−1)r0 · e
8: return e
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Table 6: Comparison of discrete Gaussian sampling with software
Design Platform Tech VDD Freq Parameters Samp. Samp.
(nm) (V) (MHz) Cycles Energy
This work ASIC 40 1.1 72
(n = 512, σ = 25.0, s = 54) 29,169 1232.71 nJ
(n = 1024, σ = 2.75, s = 11) 15,330 647.86 nJ
(n = 1024, σ = 2.30, s = 10) 14,306 604.58 nJ
Software
[44]
ARM
Cortex-M4 - 3.0 100
(n = 512, σ = 25.0, s = 54) 397,921 244.72 µJ
(n = 1024, σ = 2.75, s = 11) 325,735 200.33 µJ
(n = 1024, σ = 2.30, s = 10) 317,541 195.29 µJ
distribution. In Table 6, we have compared our Gaussian sampler performance (SHAKE-256 used as PRNG)
with software implementation on ARM Cortex-M4 using assembly-optimized Keccak [44], and we observe
up to 40× improvement in energy-efficiency after accounting for voltage scaling. Hardware architectures for
Knuth-Yao sampling have been proposed by [9] and [17], but they are for discrete Gaussian distributions with
larger standard deviation and higher precision, which we do not support.
4.5 Other Distributions
Several lattice-based protocols, such as CRYSTALS-Dilithium [27] and qTESLA [25], require polynomials to be
sampled with coefficients uniformly distributed in the range [−η, η] for a specified bound η < q. For this, we
again use rejection sampling. Unlike rejection sampling from Zq, we do not require any special techniques since
η is typically small or an integer close to a power of two.
Finally, we have also implemented a trinary sampler for polynomials with coefficients from {−1, 0,+1}.
We classify these polynomials into three categories: (1) with m non-zero coefficients, (2) with m0 +1’s and
m1 −1’s, and (3) with coefficients distributed as Pr(x = 1) = Pr(x = −1) = ρ/2 and Pr(x = 0) = 1 − ρ for
ρ ∈ {1/2, 1/4, 1/8, · · · , 1/128}. Their implementations are described in Algorithms 9, 10 and 11. For the first
two cases, we start with a zero-polynomial s of size n. Then, uniformly random coefficient indices ∈ [0, n) are
generated, and the corresponding coefficients are replaced with −1 or +1 if they are zero [25, 35]. For the
third case, sampling of the coefficients is based on the observation [54] that for a uniformly random number
x ∈ [0, 2k) we have Pr(x = 0) = 1/2k, Pr(x = 1) = 1/2k and Pr(x ∈ [2, 2k)) = 1 − 1/2k. Therefore, for the
appropriate value of k ∈ [1, 7], we can generate samples from the desired trinary distribution with ρ = 1/2k.
For all three algorithms, the symbol ∈R denotes pseudo-random number generation using the PRNG.
Algorithm 9 Trinary Sampling with m non-zero
coefficients (+1’s and −1’s)
Require: m < n and a PRNG
Ensure: s = (s0, s1, · · · , sn−1)
1: s← (0, 0, · · · , 0) ; i← 0
2: while i < m do
3: pos ∈R [0, n)
4: sign ∈R {0, 1}
5: if spos = 0 then
6: if sign = 0 then
7: spos ← 1
8: else
9: spos ← −1
10: end if
11: i← i+ 1
12: end if
13: end while
14: return s
Algorithm 10 Trinary Sampling with m0 +1’s
and m1 −1’s
Require: m0 +m1 < n and a PRNG
Ensure: s = (s0, s1, · · · , sn−1)
1: s← (0, 0, · · · , 0) ; i← 0
2: while i < m0 do
3: pos ∈R [0, n)
4: if spos = 0 then
5: spos ← +1 ; i← i+ 1
6: end if
7: end while
8: while i < m0 +m1 do
9: pos ∈R [0, n)
10: if spos = 0 then
11: spos ← −1 ; i← i+ 1
12: end if
13: end while
14: return s
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Algorithm 11 Trinary Sampling with coefficients from {−1, 0,+1} distributed according to Pr(x = 1) =
Pr(x = −1) = ρ/2 and Pr(x = 0) = 1− ρ
Require: k ∈ [1, 7], ρ = 1/2k and a PRNG
Ensure: s = (s0, s1, · · · , sn−1)
1: for (i = 0; i < n; i = i+ 1) do
2: x ∈R [0, 2k)
3: if x = 0 then
4: si ← 1
5: else if x = 1 then
6: si ← −1
7: else
8: si ← 0
9: end if
10: end for
11: return s
5 Chip Architecture
The top-level architecture of Sapphire is shown in Fig. 10. The efficient building blocks described in Sections
3 and 4 are integrated with a 1 KB instruction memory and an instruction decoder to form the core of our
crypto-processor. It can be programmed using 32-bit custom instructions to perform different polynomial
arithmetic, transform and sampling operations, as well as simple branching. For example, the following
instructions generate polynomials a, s, e ∈ Rq, and calculate a · s+ e, which is a typical computation in the
Ring-LWE-based scheme NewHope-1024:
config (n = 1024, q = 12289)
# sample_a
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, c0 = 0, c1 = 0, poly = 0)
# sample_s
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 0, k = 8, poly = 1)
# sample_e
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 1, k = 8, poly = 2)
# ntt_s
Figure 10: Sapphire lattice crypto-processor top-level architecture.
16 Sapphire: A Configurable Lattice Crypto-Processor
mult_psi (poly = 1)
transform (mode = DIF_NTT, poly_dst = 4, poly_src = 1)
# a_mul_s
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 0, poly_src = 4)
# intt_a_mul_s
transform (mode = DIT_INTT, poly_dst = 5, poly_src = 0)
mult_psi_inv (poly = 5)
# a_mul_s_plus_e
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 1, poly_src = 5)
The config instruction is first used to configure the protocol parameters n and q which, in this exam-
ple, are the parameters from NewHope-1024. For n = 1024, the polynomial cache is divided into 8 polynomials,
which are accessed using the poly argument in all instructions. For sampling, the seed can be chosen from
a pair of 256-bit registers r0 and r1, while two 16-bit registers c0 and c1 are used as counters for sampling
multiple polynomials from the same seed. For coefficient-wise operations poly_op, the poly_src argument
indicates the first source polynomial while the poly_dst argument is used to denote the second source (and
destination) polynomial. Similarly, the following set of instructions are used to generate matrix of polynomials
A ∈ R2×2q and vectors of polynomials s, e ∈ R2q , and calculate A · s+ e, which is a typical computation in the
Module-LWE-based scheme CRYSTALS-Kyber-512:
config (n = 256, q = 7681)
# sample_s
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 0, k = 3, poly = 4)
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 1, k = 3, poly = 5)
# sample_e
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 2, k = 3, poly = 24)
bin_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, c0 = 0, c1 = 3, k = 3, poly = 25)
# ntt_s
mult_psi (poly = 4)
transform (mode = DIF_NTT, poly_dst = 16, poly_src = 4)
mult_psi (poly = 5)
transform (mode = DIF_NTT, poly_dst = 17, poly_src = 5)
# sample_A0
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, c0 = 0, c1 = 0, poly = 0)
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, c0 = 1, c1 = 0, poly = 1)
# A0_mul_s
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 0, poly_src = 16)
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 1, poly_src = 17)
init (poly = 20)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 20, poly_src = 0)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 20, poly_src = 1)
# sample_A1
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, c0 = 0, c1 = 1, poly = 0)
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, c0 = 1, c1 = 1, poly = 1)
# A1_mul_s
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 0, poly_src = 16)
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 1, poly_src = 17)
init (poly = 21)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 21, poly_src = 0)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 21, poly_src = 1)
# intt_A_mul_s
transform (mode = DIT_INTT, poly_dst = 8, poly_src = 20)
mult_psi_inv (poly = 8)
transform (mode = DIT_INTT, poly_dst = 9, poly_src = 21)
mult_psi_inv (poly = 9)
# A_mul_s_plus_e
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 24, poly_src = 8)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 25, poly_src = 9)
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In this example, parameters from CRYSTALS-Kyber-512 have been used. For n = 256, the polynomial
cache is divided into 32 polynomials, which are again accessed using the poly argument. The init instruction
is used to initialize a specified polynomial with all zero coefficients. The matrix A is generated one row at a
time, following a just-in-time approach [55] instead of generating and storing all the rows together, to save
memory, which becomes especially useful when dealing with larger matrices such as in CRYSTALS-Kyber-1024
and CRYSTALS-Dilithium-IV. We have written a Perl script to parse such plain-text programs and convert
them into 32-bit binary instructions which can be decoded by the Sapphire crypto-processor. A complete list of
supported instructions is provided in Appendix B.
We use dedicated clock gates for fine-grained power savings during program execution, and an interrupt pin
is used to indicate completion of the program. Its memory and data registers can be accessed through a simple
memory-mapped interface. Using the same interface, it is also coupled with a low-power RISC-V micro-processor
[56], with 32 KB instruction memory and 64 KB data memory, which implements the RV32IM instruction set [57]
and has Dhrystone performance similar to ARM Cortex-M0. When executing cryptographic workloads in the
Sapphire core, the RISC-V core can be clock-gated using the wait-for-interrupt (wfi) instruction. The processor
is woken up by a dedicated interrupt from the Sapphire core, which is raised when the cryptographic operation
is complete. Using the memory-mapped interface ensures that the cryptographic core can be accessed through
simple load and store instructions, without requiring any custom instructions or changes to the compilation
toolchain. While the cryptographic core is used to accelerate all lattice cryptography computations, the RISC-V
processor is used for scheduling the cryptographic workloads as well as for compression and decompression
of public keys and ciphertexts. The Keccak-f[1600] core inside Sapphire can be accessed standalone through
RISC-V software, and is used to accelerate SHA-3 hashing and extendable output functions according to the
requirements of the protocol.
Our test chip was fabricated in the TSMC 40nm LP CMOS process, and the chip micrograph is shown
in Fig. 11 with the key design components highlighted. The final placed-and-routed design of our Sapphire
core consists of 106k logic gates (76 kGE for synthesized design) and 40.25 KB SRAM, with a total area of
0.28 mm2 (logic and memory combined). Our test chip supports supply voltage scaling from 0.68 V to 1.1 V.
Although one of our key design objectives was to demonstrate a configurable lattice cryptography processor,
our architecture can be easily scaled for more specific parameter sets. For example, in order to accelerate only
NewHope-512 (n = 512, q = 12289), size of the polynomial cache can be reduced to 6.5 KB (= 8× 512× 13 bits)
and the pre-computed NTT constants can be hard-coded in logic or stored in a 2.03 KB ROM (= 2.5× 512× 13
bits) instead of the 15 KB SRAM. Also, the modular arithmetic logic in the ALU can be simplified significantly
to work with a single prime only.
We use the on-chip software-configurable clock gates (shown in Fig. 10) to accurately measure power
consumption of different sub-modules inside the Sapphire core, e.g., sampling, NTT, arithmetic, etc. For
example, the following instructions are executed to measure the average power consumption of NTT over 1000
executions:
Figure 11: Chip micrograph and test chip specifications.
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clock_config (keccak = GATE, ntt = UNGATE, sampler = GATE)
c0 = 0
loop: mult_psi (poly = 0)
transform (mode = DIF_NTT, poly_dst = 4, poly_src = 0)
c0 = c0 + 1
flag = compare (c0, 1000)
if (flag == -1) goto loop
The clock_config instruction is used to control the clock gates, e.g., the PRNG and sampler clocks are
gated when measuring NTT power (the RISC-V core is clock-gated using wfi as explained earlier). A simple
loop is implemented using labels, comparison and conditional jump instructions, similar to assembly programs
in general-purpose micro-controllers (please refer to Appendix B for details of our custom instructions). One of
the chip GPIO pins is kept high during the execution of this program to indicate the measurement window,
and the power consumption is measured using a source meter. This still includes leakage power from the rest
of the chip, but it is only a small fraction of the total power compared to the dynamic power of the operation
being measured. Similarly, power consumption of the RISC-V core is measured by clock-gating the Sapphire
cryptographic core through software. Finally, leakage power of the chip is measured by externally gating the
clock signal being supplied to the chip, so that all logic inside the chip is inactive.
The RISC-V processor consumes 45 µW/MHz at 1.1 V (18 µW/MHz at 0.68 V) when running the Dhrystone
2.1 benchmark. Power consumption of the cryptographic core is a strong function of the protocols being
executed along with the associated parameters. Average power consumption of the lattice crypto-processor
was measured to be around 8 mW at 1.1 V and 72 MHz (520 µW at 0.68 V and 12 MHz). Total leakage
power of the chip was measured to be 391 µW at 1.1 V (70 µW at 0.68 V). Since our chip operates on a single
power domain, it is not possible to measure leakage power of different components of the chip. We report
the individual module-wise leakage and dynamic power consumption, as obtained from post-place-and-route
simulations of our design operating at 1.1 V and 72 MHz, in the table below:
Module Pleak (µW) Pdyn (µW) Ptot (µW)
Butterfly + ALU 18.28 9210.04 9228.32
LWE Polynomial Cache 120.28 1660.18 1780.46
NTT Constants RAM 76.50 661.61 738.11
Keccak Core + Sampler 41.15 1053.58 1094.73
RISC-V Processor + Memory 320.15 2745.68 3065.83
Before moving on to the protocol implementations and measurements, we summarize some key architectural
design techniques we have used to achieve energy-efficiency:
• We have employed increased parallelism in the modular arithmetic and CS-PRNG modules in the form of
single-cycle butterfly computation and 1600-bit 24-cycle Keccak data-path respectively. This reduces
cycle count as well as data movement and control circuitry, thus decreasing overall energy consumption.
• Based on overall computational complexity, we know that additions are much cheaper than multiplications.
Therefore, we have exploited special properties of prime q and parameter m, wherever possible, during
Barrett reduction to convert expensive multiplications into cheaper bit-shifts and additions / subtractions.
• Reading data from registers involves much smaller energy consumption compared to reading from SRAMs.
We have used registers for storing PRNG seeds, temporary values and the Keccak state, and SRAMs are
used to store only the polynomials. This significantly reduces overall energy consumption, especially for
the Keccak core.
• Software-controlled clock gates (explicitly inserted in RTL, apart from tool-inserted clock gates) for
the sampler, PRNG and NTT allow fine-grained dynamic power savings by gating inactive modules as
required during program execution.
• The crypto-processor internal memory is efficiently utilized to store polynomials during protocol execution,
thus avoiding access to the main processor’s data memory as much as possible and reducing energy
consumption.
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Figure 12: Measurement setup with our test chip.
6 Protocol Implementations and Measurement Results
To measure the efficiency of our design, we have implemented the following NIST Round 2 lattice-based
cryptography protocols on our test chip:
Algorithm Lattice Prob. NIST Sec. Parameter Set
CCA-KEM Algorithms
NewHope Ring-LWE 1 NewHope-5125 NewHope-1024
CRYSTALS-Kyber Module-LWE
1 Kyber-512
3 Kyber-768
5 Kyber-1024
Frodo LWE
1 Frodo-640
3 Frodo-976
5 Frodo-1344
Signature Algorithms
qTESLA Ring-LWE
1 qTESLA-I
3 qTESLA-III-size
3 qTESLA-III-speed
CRYSTALS-Dilithium Module-LWE
1 Dilithium-II
2 Dilithium-III
3 Dilithium-IV
where NIST security levels 1-6 indicate brute-force security matching or exceeding that of AES-128, SHA3-
256, AES-192, SHA3-384, AES-256 and SHA3-512 respectively. Fig. 12 shows our test board and measurement
setup. The test chip is housed in a QFN64 socket soldered to the board, an Opal Kelly XEM7001 FPGA
development board is used to interface with the chip, and a Keithley 2602A source meter supplies power to
the chip. Both the FPGA and the source meter are controlled from a host computer through USB and GPIB
interfaces respectively. The FPGA is used to transfer programs from the host computer to the instruction
memory of our test chip. Also, a small ring-oscillator-based true random number generator [58] implemented
on the FPGA is connected to our test chip through GPIO pins for providing fresh random inputs to the
randombytes function which is part of the NIST API. All lattice cryptography programs are written using
custom instructions and compiled with our script, while all RISC-V software is written in C and compiled using
the riscv-gcc toolchain.
6.1 Protocol Implementations and Evaluation Results
Next, we describe some key aspects of our protocol implementations along with timing and energy profiling
results. All polynomial arithmetic, transforms and sampling operations are accelerated using custom programs
running in the Sapphire core, and all SHA-3 computations utilize the Keccak core inside Sapphire. The RISC-V
processor is used only to read / write data and programs from / to the cryptographic core (both when executing
polynomial computations and when utilizing the fast Keccak core for SHA-3 operations), generate initial
randomness using the randombytes function, encode / decode messages and compress / decompress public keys
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Table 7: Measured energy and performance of public key encryption schemes
Protocol Cortex-M4 [44] This work †
Cycles Energy (µJ) Cycles Power (mW) Energy (µJ)
NewHope-512-CPA-PKE
KeyGen - - 18,667 7.15 1.85
Encrypt - - 53,499 7.79 5.79
Decrypt - - 29,099 6.81 2.77
NewHope-1024-CPA-PKE
KeyGen 1,179,353 725.30 38,012 7.39 3.90
Encrypt 1,663,023 1022.76 106,611 8.10 12.00
Decrypt 194,439 119.58 56,061 9.31 7.26
CRYSTALS-Kyber-512-CPA-PKE
KeyGen 609,923 375.10 46,187 7.61 4.90
Encrypt 721,925 443.98 66,851 8.33 7.74
Decrypt 95,894 58.97 32,198 7.67 3.45
CRYSTALS-Kyber-768-CPA-PKE
KeyGen 1,001,328 615.82 72,245 7.40 7.43
Encrypt 1,116,540 686.67 94,440 7.87 10.31
Decrypt 129,560 79.68 40,202 7.75 4.34
CRYSTALS-Kyber-1024-CPA-PKE
KeyGen 1,610,114 990.22 100,453 7.95 11.09
Encrypt 1,747,687 1074.83 124,142 7.94 13.70
Decrypt 162,204 99.76 48,205 8.42 5.65
† Includes program execution and read/write from/to crypto-processor
and ciphertexts. For polynomials which need to be read from the polynomial cache and encoded (or decoded
and written to the polynomial cache), we directly post-process the outputs (or pre-process the inputs) of the
crypto-processor’s internal memory, instead of first storing the data in intermediate temporary arrays and then
processing them. This saves around 10-20% cycles in overall protocol run-time. Also, the internal clock gates
are strategically enabled and disabled during program execution using the clock_config instruction (please
refer to Appendix B for details of our custom instructions) to reduce overall energy consumption.
For the NewHope and CRYSTALS-Kyber key exchange schemes, each of the CPA-secure public key en-
cryption functions – CPA-PKE.KeyGen, CPA-PKE.Encrypt and CPA-PKE.Decrypt – has been written entirely
(excluding the encoding and decoding operations) using Sapphire custom instructions with each of the cor-
responding programs fitting completely in its 1 KB instruction memory. The CCA-secure key encapsulation
functions – CCA-KEM.KeyGen, CCA-KEM.Encaps and CCA-KEM.Decaps – involve calls to SHA-3 and the CPA-
PKE functions (according to the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [59]), which are implemented in software. Since
the signature schemes qTESLA and CRYSTALS-Dilithium both involve probabilistic rejection of intermediate
values, the associated polynomial computations are split into multiple custom programs instead of one each
for the KeyGen, Sign and Verify functions. These blocks of code are scheduled using RISC-V software, which
also handles encoding and decoding operations. The only exception is the KeyGen step in qTESLA, where
high-precision discrete Gaussian sampling using large CDT tables is implemented in software, with the SHA-3
functions accelerated in hardware.
Since Module-LWE algorithms involve working with vectors or matrices of polynomials, it is particularly
important to ensure that these polynomials fit inside the crypto-processor memory as much as possible (because
reads and writes to the internal memory through software are not cheap). When multiplying the public matrix
A with the secret vector s, the matrix A is generated through rejection sampling, one row at a time, following
the just-in-time approach from [55]. This reduces memory footprint so that the entire computation can fit in
the polynomial cache.
In Table 7, we compare cycle count and energy consumption of our implementations of the Ring-LWE
and Module-LWE CPA-PKE schemes with assembly-optimized software on ARM Cortex-M4 micro-processor
(from PQM4 [44]), with average cycle counts for 100 executions. The energy consumption of our test chip has
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Figure 13: Configurations of the Sapphire polynomial cache for Ring-LWE and Module-LWE schemes.
Figure 14: Tiling of n× n square matrices for Frodo-640, Frodo-976 and Frodo-1344.
been measured at 1.1 V and 72 MHz, while the energy consumption of the Cortex-M4 processor is estimated
from cycle counts using average power (61.5 mW or 615 pJ/cycle at 3.0 V and 100 MHz) measured on
NUCLEO-F411RE operating at 100 MHz. The cycle count and energy consumption for our implementation
include program execution as well as the additional overhead of writing inputs to and reading outputs from
the Sapphire cryptographic core. For both NewHope and CRYSTALS-Kyber, we observe up to an order of
magnitude improvement in energy-efficiency compared to software, after accounting for voltage scaling. Fig. 13
shows how configurability of the Sapphire polynomial cache is utilized to support different ring dimensions.
Although our lattice crypto-processor architecture primarily targets Ring-LWE and Module-LWE schemes,
we also implement the LWE-based Frodo KEM protocol to demonstrate its flexibility. Since LWE-based
algorithms require large matrix multiplications, the arithmetic operations dominate total computation cost
unlike Ring-LWE and Module-LWE where sampling is the most expensive operation. Since the matrix
dimensions are not powers of two, we tile the rows or columns so that we can use the crypto-processor’s array
operations effectively, as shown in Fig. 14. For Frodo-640, we split each 640-element array into two arrays of size
512 and 128. For Frodo-976, we simply use arrays of size 1024 with the last 48 elements zeroed out or ignored,
as applicable. For Frodo-1344, we use arrays of size 1536, formed by splitting them into two arrays of size 1024
and 512, with the last 192 elements (of the 512-dimension array) zeroed out or ignored, as applicable. However,
this tiling scheme makes our version of Frodo incompatible with the reference software implementation.
Frodo involves three large matrix multiplications: AS, S′A and S′B, where A, S, S′ and B have dimensions
n× n, n× n¯, m¯× n and n× n¯ respectively with n ∈ {640, 976, 1344} and m¯ = n¯ = 8. We ensure that S′ is
stored in row-major form and B is stored in column-major form, which simplifies calculating S′B using the
schoolbook matrix multiplication technique. The poly_op instruction is used to coefficient-wise multiply a row
of the multiplier matrix with a column of the multiplicand matrix, and the sum_elems instruction computes
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the sum of its elements to generate one element of the output matrix (please refer to Appendix B for details of
our custom instructions). For calculating the matrix AS, we generate A in row-major form (using rejection
sampling, with zero chance of rejection since q is a power of two) and S in column major form (using CDT-based
discrete Gaussian sampling) so that the same techniques still work. For n ∈ {640, 976}, the matrix S is gener-
ated two columns at a time to reduce the number of outer loop iterations, as illustrated in the pseudo-code below:
#if (n == 1344)
for (j = 0; j < nbar; j = j + 1) {
#else
for (j = 0; j < nbar/2; j = j + 2) {
#endif
cdt_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, ..., poly = 0)
#if (n != 1344)
cdt_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, ..., poly = 1)
#endif
for (i = 0; i < n; i = i + 1) {
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, ..., poly = 4)
#if (n != 1344)
poly_copy (poly_dst = 5, poly_src = 4)
#endif
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 4, poly_src = 0)
AS[i][j] = sum_elems (poly = 4)
#if (n != 1344)
poly_op (op = MUL, poly_dst = 5, poly_src = 1)
AS[i][j+1] = sum_elems (poly = 5)
#endif
}
}
Since both matrices S′ and A are generated on-the-fly in row-major fashion, this makes calculating S′A
a bit complicated. We multiply each element of the i-th row of A with the i-th element of the j-th row of S′
to generate a partial sum. These i partial sums are incrementally added together to compute the j-th row of
the output matrix S′A. Once again, we generate S two columns at a time to reduce the number of outer loop
iterations. The corresponding pseudo-code is shown below:
#if (n == 1344)
for (j = 0; j < nbar; j = j + 1) {
#else
for (j = 0; j < nbar/2; j = j + 2) {
#endif
cdt_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, ..., poly = 0)
init (poly = 6)
#if (n != 1344)
cdt_sample (prng = SHAKE-256, seed = r1, ..., poly = 1)
init (poly = 7)
#endif
for (i = 0; i < n; i = i + 1) {
rej_sample (prng = SHAKE-128, seed = r0, ..., poly = 4)
reg = (poly = 0)[i]
poly_op (op = CONST_MUL, poly_dst = 2, poly_src = 4)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 6, poly_src = 2)
#if (n != 1344)
reg = (poly = 1)[i]
poly_op (op = CONST_MUL, poly_dst = 3, poly_src = 4)
poly_op (op = ADD, poly_dst = 7, poly_src = 3)
#endif
}
}
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where the reg = (poly)[i] instruction is used to save the i-th element of the array in the 24-bit inter-
nal register reg, the init (poly) instruction creates an array of zeros and the CONST_MUL operation multiplies
each element of an array with the value stored in reg (please refer to Appendix B for details of our instructions).
The AS + E and S′A + E′ computations require 10.9M and 9.9M cycles respectively for Frodo-640, and
25.3M and 23.2M cycles respectively for Frodo-976, and 67.1M and 62.7M cycles respectively for Frodo-1344,
which constitute majority of the total cycle count. This is quite different from the Ring-LWE and Module-LWE
schemes, where polynomial sampling accounts for 60-70% of the total computation cost. Please note that
memory usage of Frodo-1344-CCA-KEM-Decaps exceeds the 64 KB processor data memory on our test chip;
hence it was evaluated only in simulation, with power consumption extrapolated from measured power for
Frodo-640 and Frodo-976.
In Tables 8 and 9, we have compared cycle count and energy consumption of assembly-optimized Cortex-M4
software [44] with our hardware-accelerated implementation on our test chip operating at 1.1 V and 72 MHz,
with average cycle counts for 100 executions. Clearly, our design achieves up to an order of magnitude
improvement in energy-efficiency and performance compared to state-of-the-art software. We note that Module-
LWE schemes, although a bit slower compared to Ring-LWE, offer parameters with better scalability in
terms of security and efficiency compared to Ring-LWE schemes. Among the key encapsulation schemes,
NewHope and CRYSTALS-Kyber are two orders of magnitude more efficient than Frodo, owing to the inherent
structure in ideal and module lattices where the key operation is polynomial multiplication as opposed to
matrix multiplication in standard lattices. Among the digital signature schemes evaluated, qTESLA allows
faster signature generation and verification compared to CRYSTALS-Kyber. However, our implementation of
the key generation step in qTESLA is quite expensive since it uses CDT-based discrete Gaussian sampling with
large tables and high precision. This is not a big concern since signature key-pairs are generated infrequently;
also, more specialized hardware can be added to our architecture to support such distribution parameters,
albeit at the cost of logic area.
In Fig. 15, we plot the measured energy consumption of the Ring-LWE and Module-LWE-based CCA-
KEM-Encaps and Sign algorithms at different post-quantum security levels, as implemented on our test chip
operating at at 1.1 V and 72 MHz. Due to the configurability of our lattice crypto-processor, we are able to
implement all these different modes and achieve energy scalability through efficiency versus security trade-offs.
Figure 15: Energy consumption of Ring-LWE and Module-LWE-based (a) CCA-KEM-Encaps and (b) Sign
algorithms at different post-quantum security levels.
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Table 8: Measured energy and performance of key encapsulation schemes
Protocol Cortex-M4 [44] This work
Cycles Energy Cycles Power Energy
(µJ) (mW) (µJ)
NewHope-512-CCA-KEM
KeyGen - - 52,063 6.04 4.37
Encaps - - 136,077 5.30 10.02
Decaps - - 142,295 5.80 11.46
NewHope-1024-CCA-KEM
KeyGen 1,243,729 764.89 97,969 6.13 8.35
Encaps 1,963,184 1207.34 236,812 5.05 16.59
Decaps 1,978,982 1217.07 258,872 5.89 21.17
CRYSTALS-Kyber-512-CCA-KEM
KeyGen 726,921 447.06 74,519 5.77 5.97
Encaps 987,864 607.54 131,698 5.12 9.37
Decaps 1,018,946 626.65 142,309 5.69 11.25
CRYSTALS-Kyber-768-CCA-KEM
KeyGen 1,200,291 738.18 111,525 5.28 8.19
Encaps 1,446,284 889.46 177,540 5.19 12.80
Decaps 1,477,365 908.58 190,579 5.86 15.52
CRYSTALS-Kyber-1024-CCA-KEM
KeyGen 1,771,729 1089.61 148,547 5.95 12.27
Encaps 2,142,912 1317.89 223,469 5.25 16.3
Decaps 2,188,917 1346.18 240,977 5.91 19.76
Frodo-640-CCA-KEM
KeyGen 81,293,476 49995.49 11,453,942 6.65 1057.65
Encaps 86,178,252 52999.62 11,609,668 7.01 1129.95
Decaps 87,170,982 53610.15 12,035,513 6.88 1150.83
Frodo-976-CCA-KEM
KeyGen - - 26,005,326 6.70 2420.97
Encaps - - 29,749,417 7.05 2912.95
Decaps - - 30,421,175 6.94 2932.13
Frodo-1344-CCA-KEM
KeyGen - - 67,994,170 6.75 6374.45
Encaps - - 71,501,358 7.10 7050.83
Decaps - - 72,526,695 7.00 7051.21
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Table 9: Measured energy and performance of digital signature schemes
Protocol Cortex-M4 [44] This work
Cycles Energy Cycles Power Energy
(µJ) (mW) (µJ)
qTESLA-I
KeyGen 17,545,901 10790.73 4,846,949 7.89 531.55
Sign 6,317,445 3885.23 168,273 9.99 23.34
Verify 1,059,370 651.51 38,922 7.99 4.32
qTESLA-III-size
KeyGen 58,227,852 35810.13 11,479,190 7.71 1229.18
Sign 19,869,370 12219.66 348,429 9.97 48.23
Verify 2,297,530 1412.98 69,154 7.59 7.27
qTESLA-III-speed
KeyGen 30,720,411 18893.05 11,898,241 7.64 1262.39
Sign 11,987,079 7372.05 317,083 9.97 43.91
Verify 2,225,296 1368.56 67,712 7.30 6.86
CRYSTALS-Dilithium-I
KeyGen - - 95,202 6.82 9.00
Sign - - 376,392 6.77 35.41
Verify - - 142,576 7.73 15.31
CRYSTALS-Dilithium-II
KeyGen - - 130,022 7.24 13.08
Sign - - 514,246 7.68 54.82
Verify - - 184,933 7.49 19.23
CRYSTALS-Dilithium-III
KeyGen 2,322,955 1428.62 167,433 7.36 17.11
Sign 9,978,000 6136.47 634,763 7.40 65.26
Verify 2,322,765 1428.50 229,481 7.41 23.63
CRYSTALS-Dilithium-IV
KeyGen - - 223,272 6.89 21.38
Sign - - 815,636 6.93 78.53
Verify - - 276,221 7.44 28.55
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Table 10: Comparison of our design with state-of-the-art hardware
Design Platform Tech VDD Freq Protocol Area Cycles Energy
(nm) (V) (MHz) (kGE) (µJ)
This work ASIC 40 1.1 72
NewHope-512-CCA-KEM-Encaps
106
136,077 10.02
NewHope-1024-CPA-PKE-Encrypt 106,611 12.00
Kyber-512-CCA-KEM-Encaps 131,698 9.37
Kyber-768-CPA-PKE-Encrypt 94,440 10.31
Kyber-768-CCA-KEM-Encaps 177,540 12.80
Frodo-640-CCA-KEM-Encaps 11,609,668 1129.95
Dilithium-II-Sign 514,246 54.82
Basu et al.
[20] † ASIC 65 1.2
169 NewHope-512-CCA-KEM-Encaps 1273 307,847 69.42
200 Kyber-512-CCA-KEM-Encaps 1341 31,669 6.21
158 Dilithium-II-Sign 1603 155,166 50.42
Albrecht
et al. [18] SLE 78 - - 50
Kyber-768-CPA-PKE-Encrypt
-
4,747,291
-
Kyber-768-CCA-KEM-Encaps 5,117,996
Oder et al.
[13] FPGA - - 117 NewHope-1024-Simple-Encrypt - 179,292 -
Howe et al.
[16] FPGA - - 167 Frodo-640-CCA-KEM-Encaps - 3,317,760 -
Fritzmann
et al. [60] FPGA - - - NewHope-1024-CPA-PKE-Encrypt - 589,285 -
Hutter
et al. [61] † ASIC 130 1.2 1 Curve25519-ECDHE 50 1,622,354 113.56
Banerjee
et al. [56] ASIC 65 1.2 20
NIST-P256-ECDHE
149
680,000 24.07
NIST-P256-ECDSA-Sign 180,000 6.48
† Only post-synthesis area and energy consumption reported
In Table 10, we compare our design with existing hardware-accelerated implementations of NIST Round 2
lattice-based protocols. Our crypto-processor is significantly smaller than the multiple designs generated using
high-level synthesis in [20], and is also more flexible and energy-efficient. Our Kyber implementation is faster
than [18] which uses RSA, AES and SHA hardware accelerators on the SLE 78 security controller platform
to accelerate lattice cryptography. Efficiency of our design is greater than or comparable to state-of-the-art
FPGA implementations of Ring-LWE [13, 60]. Notably, [60] also uses a RISC-V processor with NTT and SHA
accelerators to implement the NewHope protocol. However, our implementation of Frodo, which re-purposes
the Ring/Module-LWE hardware for LWE computations, is not as efficient as the dedicated LWE accelerator
in [16]. Finally, we also compare our design with state-of-the-art pre-quantum elliptic curve cryptography
hardware [56, 61], and we observe our implementation of CCA-secure lattice-based key encapsulation using
NewHope-512 to be around 5× more efficient compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange using the
NIST P-256 curve at comparable pre-quantum security level.
6.2 Side-Channel Analysis
Side-channel security is an important aspect of all public-key cryptography implementations and lattice-based
cryptography is not an exception. In order to prevent information leakage through timing side channels,
the most important requirement is to ensure that the timing and memory access patterns of underlying
computations are independent of the secret data being computed upon. In our implementation, this is achieved
either by making the computations constant-time, e.g., binomial sampling, discrete Gaussian sampling, NTT
and polynomial arithmetic, or by using rejection sampling, e.g, sampling numbers from [0, q) or [−η, η] or
probabilistic rejection during signature schemes. Since our cryptographic core and RISC-V processor both have
a single-level memory hierarchy, the possibility of cache timing attacks is also eliminated.
Our power side-channel measurement setup is shown in Fig. 17. Our test board has an 18 Ω resistor
connected in series between the power supply and the VDD pin of our test chip. The voltage across this resistor,
proportional to the chip’s current draw, is magnified using a non-inverting differential amplifier (consists of an
AD8001 op-amp chip, with 6 dB flat gain up to 100 MHz, in the non-inverting configuration with resistors of
appropriate sizes) and then observed through a 2.5 GS/s Tektronix MDO3024 mixed domain oscilloscope.
The execution times of binomial sampling, discrete Gaussian sampling, NTT, polynomial coefficient-wise
multiplication and addition (with n = 1024 and q = 12289) were measured for 10,000 random executions to
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Figure 16: Measured power waveforms for different polynomial sampling, transform and arithmetic operations
along with histograms of energy consumption for 10,000 measurements for each operation, obtained from our
test chip operating at 1.1 V and 12 MHz.
verify that these computations are indeed constant-time. The corresponding power waveforms and energy
consumption histograms, measured from our test chip operating at 1.1 V and 12 MHz, are shown in Fig. 16.
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Figure 17: Power side-channel measurement setup.
Typical simple power analysis (SPA) attacks on lattice cryptography implementations exploit information
leakage through conditional branching or data-dependent execution times during the modular arithmetic
computations in NTT or polynomial coefficient-wise multiplication [62, 63, 64]. As explained in Fig. 16, our
implementation of polynomial arithmetic is constant-time. To quantitatively evaluate SPA resistance of our
design, we perform a difference-of-means test [65, 64, 66] on three polynomial operations – NTT, coefficient-wise
multiplication and coefficient-wise addition – which are traditionally used as attack points. In this test, we
try to differentiate two sets of measurements – those with a particular coefficient (‘0’-th coefficient in our
case) in the input polynomial set to 0 (denoted as set ‘0’ or S0) versus the same coefficient set to q − 1
(denoted as set ‘1’ or S1) – by comparing their means separately for each point in the mean power trace. The
difference-of-means is calculated for increasing number of measurements and plotted as a function of the number
of traces N . The corresponding 99.99% confidence interval for having a zero difference of means between these
two sets is calculated as tc ·
√
(σ20 + σ21)/N , where σ0 and σ1 are the standard deviations of the two sets S0
and S1 respectively and tc is the critical t-statistic for N − 1 degrees of freedom and cumulative probability
= 1 − (1 − 0.9999)/2 = 0.99995. As long as the absolute difference-of-means is smaller than the confidence
interval, it is a strong indicator that the sets S0 and S1 are indistinguishable.
Figure 18: Difference-of-means test for polynomial NTT with representative power traces from set S0 (top left)
and S1 (top right), difference waveform (bottom left) and difference of means versus number of traces with
99.99% confidence interval (bottom right).
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Figure 19: Difference-of-means test for polynomial coefficient-wise multiplication with representative power
traces from set S0 (top left) and S1 (top right), difference waveform (bottom left) and difference of means
versus number of traces with 99.99% confidence interval (bottom right).
Figure 20: Difference-of-means test for polynomial coefficient-wise addition with representative power traces
from set S0 (top left) and S1 (top right), difference waveform (bottom left) and difference of means versus
number of traces with 99.99% confidence interval (bottom right).
In Figures 18, 19 and 20, we provide preliminary difference-of-means test results for three polynomial
operations (with n = 1024 and q = 12289) as measured from our test chip operating at 1.1 V and 10 MHz.
Sampling rate of the oscilloscope was set to 500 MS/s for NTT and 2.5 GS/s for coefficient-wise multiplication
and addition. The red lines denote measured difference-of-means, and the dashed lines mark the 99.99%
confidence interval for ideal zero difference-of-means. These results validate that our design is secure against
SPA side-channel attacks.
The protocol implementations discussed earlier do not have any explicit countermeasures against differential
power analysis (DPA) attacks. Although DPA attacks can be mitigated by using ephemeral keys, it is still
important to analyze how these protocols can be made DPA-secure. Masking-based countermeasures have been
proposed in [67, 68, 46] for Ring-LWE encryption. Since our crypto-processor is programmable, such masked
protocols can be implemented using the right mix of software and hardware acceleration. For example, we
consider NewHope-CPA-PKE and discuss how the masked decryption algorithm, inspired by [67, 68, 46], can be
implemented using our hardware. A simplified version of the CPA-PKE scheme, excluding any key / ciphertext
compression / decompression and encoding / decoding and implementation-specific details, is provided below:
function NewHope-CPA-PKE.KeyGen(seed):
Sample aˆ, s, e ∈ Rq
bˆ← aˆ sˆ+ eˆ
return (pk = (aˆ, bˆ), sk = sˆ)
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function NewHope-CPA-PKE.Encrypt(pk, coin, µ ∈ {0, · · · , 255}32):
Sample s′, e′, e′′ ∈ Rq
uˆ← aˆ sˆ′ + eˆ′
v ← Encode(µ) ∈ Rq
v′ ← b · s′ + e′′ + v
return c = (uˆ, v′)
function NewHope-CPA-PKE.Decrypt(sk, c):
v′′ ← v′ − u · s
µ← Decode(v′′) ∈ {0, · · · , 255}32
return µ
where µ is the 32-byte message to be encrypted, xˆ is the NTT representation of polynomial x ∈ Rq, 
denotes coefficient-wise multiplication (in the transform domain) and · denotes polynomial multiplication in
Rq. The Encode function converts message µ into a polynomial in Rq. To allow robustness against errors,
each bit of the 256-bit message is encoded into bn/256c coefficients. For example, for n = 1024, the i-th,
(256 + i)-th, (512 + i)-th and (768 + i)-th coefficients are set to 0 or bq/2c depending on whether the i-th bit in
µ is 0 or 1 respectively, for i ∈ {0, · · · , 255}. The Decode function maps bn/256c coefficients of a polynomial
back to the original message bit. For example, for n = 1024, it takes the i-th, (256 + i)-th, (512 + i)-th and
(768 + i)-th coefficients (each in the range {0, · · · , q − 1}, subtracts bq/2c from each of them, accumulates their
absolute values, and finally sets the i-th message bit to 0 if the sum is larger than q or to 1 otherwise, for
i ∈ {0, · · · , 255}. Further details about these functions are available in the NewHope specification document
[24]. The Decrypt algorithm requires one polynomial coefficient-wise multiplication uˆ  sˆ, one inverse NTT
(including multiplication with n−1ψ−i) to compute u ·s, and one polynomial coefficient-wise subtraction v′−u ·s.
Figure 21 shows the corresponding measured power waveform for n = 1024.
Similar to the encryption scheme studied in [68], we note that NewHope-CPA-PKE is also additively
homomorphic, that is, if c1 = (uˆ1, v′1) and c2 = (uˆ2, v′2) are the ciphertexts corresponding to messages µ1 and
µ2 respectively, under the same key-pair, then (uˆ1 + uˆ2, v′1 + v′2) will be the ciphertext corresponding to µ1⊕µ2.
Following the works of [67, 68, 46], this property can be exploited to randomize the decryption algorithm (as a
first-order DPA countermeasure) as explained below:
1. Generate a secret random message µr
2. Encrypt µr to its corresponding ciphertext cr = (uˆr, v′r)
3. Compute cm = (uˆ+ uˆr, v′ + v′r), where c = (uˆ, v′) is the original ciphertext
4. Decrypt masked ciphertext cm to obtain µm = µ⊕ µr, where µ is the original message
5. Recover original message µ = µm ⊕ µr
Therefore, the masked decryption now requires generation of a random message along with invocations of
both the Encrypt and Decrypt functions. As explained earlier, these functions can be implemented entirely
using Sapphire custom programs, so the masking involves minimal software overheads. Referring to the cycle
counts and energy consumption of NewHope-1024-CPA-PKE in Table 7, we note that the masked decryption is
about 3× less efficient compared to the unmasked version, both in terms of energy and performance. Since
Figure 21: Power trace for the NewHope-1024-CPA-PKE.Decrypt algorithm, measured from our test chip
operating at 1.1 V and 12 MHz.
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µr is independent from the original message µ, the ciphertext cr can be pre-computed offline in order to
reduce online computation time and energy consumption. As explained in [68], this technique does not
require any modifications to the Decode function. However, addition of ciphertexts increases the noise in
them, thus increasing the decryption failure rate. Each of the two polynomials in the ciphertext contains one
noise term whose coefficients are derived from the zero-mean binomial distribution with support [−k, k] and
standard deviation σ =
√
k/2 (k = 8 for NewHope). When two such ciphertexts are added, the resulting noise
distribution (still binomial) now has support [−2k, 2k] with standard deviation σ =√2k/2 = √k, that is, the
noise variance is doubled. For k = 16, which is also used in NewHope-Simple, the decryption failure probability
will go up from 2−216 [24] to 2−60 [69]. As discussed in [68], standard deviation of the error distribution can be
decreased to allow correct decryptions at the cost of a minor deterioration in security. So, one possibility is to
set k = 4 in the unmasked scheme (so that k = 8 for masked decryption and failure probability remains 2−216).
The corresponding decrease in security level is from 289 bits to 268 bits, as obtained from the LWE hardness
estimator [70] using the following Sage module:
load("https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/raw/HEAD/estimator.py")
n = 1024; q = 12289; stddev = sqrt(4/2); alpha = sqrt(2*pi)*stddev/q
_ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, reduction_cost_model=BKZ.sieve)
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have presented a configurable lattice cryptography processor supporting different parameters
for NIST Round 2 lattice-based key encapsulation and digital signature protocols such as NewHope, qTESLA,
CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Frodo. Efficient modular arithmetic, sampling and NTT
memory architectures together provide an order of magnitude improvement in performance and energy-efficiency
compared to state-of-the-art software and hardware implementations. Our ASIC implementation was fabricated
in a 40nm low-power CMOS process and all measurement results are obtained from our test chip operating at
1.1 V and 72 MHz. Our protocol implementations are secure against timing and simple power analysis attacks,
and we also discuss how masking countermeasures against differential power analysis can be implemented using
the programmability of our crypto-processor.
Since our design supports configurable lattice parameters, it will be interesting to explore other lattice-based
protocols such as Saber [71] and Round5 [72], which are based on the LWR (learning with rounding) problem
[73]. More concrete analysis of DPA-secure masked implementations, for CPA-PKE, CCA-KEM and signature
schemes, along with leakage tests and impact on performance and energy-efficiency, will also be performed in
the future. Finally, non-lattice-based post-quantum protocols can also be implemented on our platform, using
a mix of hardware acceleration and software, since they can still benefit from our efficient implementation of
modular arithmetic and SHA-3 computations.
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Appendix A Modular Reduction Parameters
As mentioned in Section 3, our modular multiplier with pseudo-configurable prime modulus uses efficient
Barrett reduction, with the parameters m, k and q coded in digital logic, for a set of chosen primes. These
parameters and the corresponding reduction implementations are detailed here. Please note that m and q are
written in the form 2l1 ± 2l2 ± · · · ± 1 only when the number of such integers l1, l2, · · · is less than 5.
Algorithm Reduction mod 7681
Require: q = 213 − 29 + 1,m = 273 = 28 + 24 + 1, k = 21, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 8) + (x 4) + x
2: t← t 21
3: t← (t 13)− (t 9) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 12289
Require: q = 213 + 212 + 1,m = 10921, k = 27, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 10921 · x
2: t← t 27
3: t← (t 13) + (t 12) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 40961
Require: q = 215 + 213 + 1,m = 52427, k = 31, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 52427 · x
2: t← t 31
3: t← (t 15) + (t 13) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
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Algorithm Reduction mod 120833
Require: q = 217 − 214 + 213 − 211 + 1,m = 71089, k = 33, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 71089 · x
2: t← t 33
3: t← (t 17)− (t 14) + (t 13)− (t 11) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 133121
Require: q = 217 + 211 + 1,m = 64527 = 216 − 210 + 24 − 1, k = 33, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 16)− (x 10) + (x 4)− x
2: t← t 33
3: t← (t 17) + (t 11) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 184321
Require: q = 217 + 215 + 214 + 212 + 1,m = 46603, k = 33, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 46603 · x
2: t← t 33
3: t← (t 17) + (t 15) + (t 14) + (t 12) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 8380417
Require: q = 223 − 213 + 1,m = 8396807 = 223 + 213 + 23 − 1, k = 46, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 23) + (x 13) + (x 3)− x
2: t← t 46
3: t← (t 23)− (t 13) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
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Algorithm Reduction mod 8058881
Require: q = 8058881,m = 8731825, k = 46, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 8731825 · x
2: t← t 46
3: t← 8058881 · t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 4205569
Require: q = 222 + 213 + 211 + 210 + 1,m = 4183069, k = 44, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← 4183069 · x
2: t← t 44
3: t← (t 22) + (t 13) + (t 11) + (t 10) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 4206593
Require: q = 222 + 213 + 212 + 1,m = 2091025 = 221 − 213 + 211 + 24 + 1, k = 43, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 21)− (x 13) + (x 11) + (x 4) + x
2: t← t 43
3: t← (t 22) + (t 13) + (t 12) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
Algorithm Reduction mod 8404993
Require: q = 223 + 214 + 1,m = 4186127 = 222 − 213 + 24 − 1, k = 45, x ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: t← (x 22)− (x 13) + (x 4)− x
2: t← t 45
3: t← (t 23) + (t 14) + t
4: z ← x− t
5: if z ≥ q then
6: z ← z − q
7: end if
8: return z
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For the prime q = 65537 = 216 + 1, we employ an easier reduction technique owing to the special structure
of q. Any integer x ∈ [0, q2) can be written as x = x2232 + x1216 + x0 where x0 and x1 are 16-bit numbers and
x2 ∈ {0, 1}. Since 216 ≡ −1mod q, we have x ≡ x0 − x1 + x2 mod q, which must be followed by a conditional
addition to bring back the result to [0, q).
Algorithm Reduction mod 65537
Require: q = 216 + 1, x = x2232 + x1216 + x0 ∈ [0, q2)
Ensure: z = x mod q
1: z ← x0 − x1 + x2
2: if z < 0 then
3: z ← z + q
4: end if
5: return z
Appendix B Custom Instruction Set Summary
In this section, we briefly describe all the custom instructions supported by our crypto-processor. Apart from
the polynomials stored in its memory and the 256-bit seed registers r0 and r1, these are the core internal
registers that can also be manipulated:
• 24-bit temporary registers reg and tmp
• 16-bit counter registers c0 and c1
• 2-bit flag register to store comparison results (-1, 0 or +1)
Following is the list of instructions along with short descriptions:
Configuration: set parameters and clock gates
config (n, q)
clock_config (keccak, ntt, sampler)
Register Operations: register assignments and arithmetic
c0 = #VAL / c0 + #VAL / c0 - #VAL
c1 = #VAL / c1 + #VAL / c1 - #VAL
reg = #VAL / tmp
tmp = #VAL / tmp (OP) reg
where #VAL can be any unsigned integer of appropriate size, and (OP) is one of the
following operations: {ADD, SUB, MUL, AND, OR, XOR, RSHIFT, LSHIFT}
Register-Polynomial Operations: register and polynomial interactions
reg = max_elems (poly)
reg = sum_elems (poly)
reg = (poly)[#VAL] / (poly)[c0] / (poly)[c1]
(poly)[#VAL] / (poly)[c0] / (poly)[c1] = reg
Transforms: number theoretic transform and related computations
transform (mode, poly_dst, poly_src)
mult_psi (poly) / mult_psi_inv (poly)
where mode is one of the following: {DIF_NTT, DIF_INTT, DIT_NTT, DIT_INTT}
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Sampling: polynomial sampling from various distributions
bin_sample (prng, seed, c0, c1, k, poly)
cdt_sample (prng, seed, c0, c1, r, s, poly)
rej_sample (prng, seed, c0, c1, poly)
uni_sample (prng, seed, c0, c1, eta, bitlen, poly)
tri_sample_1 (prng, seed, c0, c1, m, poly)
tri_sample_2 (prng, seed, c0, c1, m0, m1, poly)
tri_sample_3 (prng, seed, c0, c1, rho, poly)
where prng can be SHAKE-128 or SHAKE-256, seed can be r0 or r1, and k, r, s,
eta, bitlen, m, m0, m1, rho are the distribution parameters
Polynomial Computations: polynomial initialization and other operations
init (poly)
poly_copy (poly_dst, poly_src)
poly_op (op, poly_dst, poly_src)
shift_poly (ring, poly_dst, poly_src)
where op can be one of the following: {ADD, SUB, MUL, BITREV, CONST_ADD,
CONST_SUB, CONST_MUL, CONST_AND, CONST_OR, CONST_XOR, CONST_RSHIFT,
CONST_LSHIFT}, and ring can be either x^N+1 or x^N-1
Comparison and Branching: simple branching operations
flag = eq_check (poly, poly)
flag = inf_norm_check (poly, bound)
flag = compare (reg / tmp / c0 / c1, #VAL)
if (flag == / != -1 / 0 / +1) goto <label>
where the flag register stores -1, 0 and +1 for the register comparison result being
“lesser than”, “equal to” and “greater than” respectively, and it stores 1 or 0 depending
on whether the equality check and infinity norm check has passed or failed respectively
SHA-3 Computations: hashing operations
sha3_init
sha3_256_absorb (poly)
sha3_512_absorb (poly)
sha3_256_absorb (r0 / r1)
sha3_512_absorb (r0 / r1)
r0 / r1 = sha3_256_digest
r0 || r1 = sha3_512_digest
where the seed registers are used to store the hash outputs – either r0 or r1 for
SHA-3-256, and both r0 and r1 together for SHA-3-512
